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Abstract•

A data base is compromised if a user can determine the data

elements associated with keys which he did not know previously.

If it

is possible, compromise can be achieved by posing a finite set of queries
over sets of data elements and employing initial information to solve the
resulting system of equations.

Assuming the allowable queries are linear,

that is, weighted sums of data elements, we show how comprise can be
achieved and we characterize the maximal initial information permitted
of a user in a secure system.

When compromise is possible, the initial

information and the number of queries required to achieve it is surprisingly
small.

Work reported herein was supported in part by NSF Grant MCS75-21100
and by Purdue David Ross Grant 7994-56-13985.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Statistical data bases contain sensitive information about individuals.

Their purpose is to provide summary statistics about groups of people,
while permitting only authorized access to the records of any one individual.

But this objective is difficult to meet, for seemingly innocuous

summaries contain vestiges of the original data.

By correlating enough

summaries, an intruder may infer confidential data.

We understand much

more about controlling access to individual records than we do about controlling inference.
A query is a function applied to a given subset of the records in
the data base; this subset is called the query set.

Given the form of

allowable queries and an assumption about the information known initially
by enquirers, we wish to specify whether or not the data base is secure.
A proof that a data base can be compromised amounts to exhibiting a
method for constructing a sequence of queries whose responses imply
the value associated with a given, arbitrary key.

A proof that a data

base is secure is much more difficult, for it requires us to demonstrate
that no such sequence exists.
Inference has long been a concern of census statisticians, who have
developed sophisticated methods for choosing samples for analysis.

The

principle is to apply queries against a random subfile; deducing an element of the subfile is of little help because the relation between the subfile and the full population is unknown.

Unfortunately, many contemporary

applications center on small or medium data bases where random sampling
cannot be used.
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Much existing literature on inference applies to counting queries,
which return the number of individuals satisfying given characteristics
-- e.g., "Female astronomers over 40 years of age."
HoM70, Sch75].

[Haq74, Haq75,

These studies have shown that the danger of compromise

is greatest when the system responds for small query sets.

Some

protection is afforded when the system refuses answers for small counts
[Chi77, FeP74, Sch76].

However, this protection is far from complete

[DDS77, Scw77].
Another class of easily compromised queries is selection queries.
Such a query returns a specific value from the query set, such as the
largest, the smallest, or the median.

These queries are easily compromised

even if the data base system somehow enforces

a restriction that no two

query sets overlap by more than one record [Dav76, DJL76, Rei77, DDL76].
The subject of this paper is the class of linear queries.

Each of

these queries returns a weighted sum of elements in the query set.

Our

results extend those of Dobkin, Jones, and Lipton [DJL76], whose queries
computed simple (unweighted) sums of elements in the query sets.
aspect of the results is striking:

One

a user who knows as little as the value

associated with a single key can often achieve a full compromise of the
entire data base -- with a query sequence whose length is not much longer
than the number of stored data elements.
As a running example, we will use the data base displayed in Table 1,
referred to hereafter as the "runner's data base."
foot racers.

It contains facts about

Users of the data base might be allowed to discover general

properties such as average running paces; however, they are not supposed
to be able to deduce facts about individual runners from these queries.
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Table 1.

Runner's Data Base.

1
Max
VOX

2
Train
pace
sec/mi

Smith

68

380

680

22

260

3183

1948

2 Jones

61

405

530

18

287

3520

1950

3

Burns

56

440

460

20

316

3818

1940

4

Cohen

48

485

410

18

368

4447

1930

5

Cook

49

470

375

20

360

4394

1962

6

Bloom

54

440

430

20

328

3980

1948

7

King

53

440

405

20

334

4072

1943

8

Frank

72

370

705

23

251

2997

1947

KEYS
i

1

j

3
4
Prior 8 weeks
Longest
Total
Run
Miles

5
Fastest
1 mile
sec.

7
6
Fastest Year
10 miles of
sec.
Birth

"Max VOX" is the maximum volume of oxygen processable
in milliliters per kilogram body weight per minute.
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MODEL OF A DATA BASE
A statistical data base contains a set of records about individuals.
Each record contains an identifier field, one or more category fields, and
one or more data fields.

Some data fields may also be category fields.

The identifier field contains a unique identifier for the record.
Reading and writing in single records via identifiers is controlled by
an access mechanism.

A user presents the symbolic name of a record, the

system looks up the identifier corresponding to that name and checks
authorization.
A data element is a value stored in a given data field of a given
record.
in it.

The size of the data base is the total number, N, of data elements
In a partitioned data base, the data elements are divided into

mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive classes.
denoted Y., contains N. data elements, and N = E. N..
J

J

3

the runner's data base are examples of classes.

1

The jth class,
The columns of

A key p = (i,j) identifies

a data element, which is denoted either x or x...
P
iJ
A query set is a collection of data elements identified by a list
of keys or by a characteristic formula.

(A characteristic formula is

a logical formula which is matched against the values in category fields.)
A queTy computes some value for the query set.

To prevent trivial compromises

a query program will not respond if the query set contains fewer than k
data elements, where k > 2 is a parameter of the system.
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EXAMPLE.

The runner's data base contains 8 Tecords and 7 data

fields, a total of N =56 data elements.

The keys are pairs

(i,j) where i is a row index and j is a column index.

The user

would specify symbolic name, pairs which would be translated to
keys internally; for example, (Smith, Max VOX) translates to
(1,1) and (Cohen, Year of Birth) to (4,7).

The corresponding

data elements are x^j = 68 and x ^ = 1930.

A possible key-

specified query is "What is the average train-pace for (Smith,
Jones, Frank)?"
formula

The same query expressed with a characteristic

is "What is the average train-pace among Tunners whose

Max VOX is greater than 60?"

This paper analyzes threats to statistical data base security for
key-specified query sets.

Security for characteristic-specified query

sets is treated in other papers [DDS77, Scw77].

A summary of important

results for both types of query sets is given in [Den78].

Compromising the Data Base
A

user has identified a key (i,j) as soon as he knows the value of

its data element x ^ .
the data base:

A user usually has some initial information about

he may know operational details of some query programs, or

the values of some data elements.

Relative to an assumption about initial

information, a data base is insecure if it is possible to identify keys
not known initially.

Identifying previously unknown keys is a compromise,
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and identifying all the keys is a full compromise.

If the data base is

insecure there will exist a finite sequence of queries
sets Xj,...,Xm, and responses

query

f°r which it is possible to solve

the system of equations

V

1=

w

v 2 = q2CX2)
CD

...
V

ra

Sn^nP

for some unknown key.
We are interested in characterizing the amount of initial information
that can be tolerated in a secure system, and the amount of work of
compromise an insecure system.

EXAMPLE.

A regression analysis has yielded a formula to predict

the time a runner will take to run a marathon [FoD75]:
4
(2) q(i) = J a. x.. + 319 seconds.
j=l 3
Suppose that this query is available in the data base and that the
user knows the coefficients a^ (e.g.> from reading the article).
If that user also knows any three of x. 1} x.-, x.„, and x..,
he can
'
ll
i2
I3
i4
use the system's response to qCi) to solve Equation 2 for the fourth.
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Linear Queries
To pose a query, a user specifies a list of distinct keys
the system determines the query set {x
P

of the query function for it.

,...,x
1

p

) and computes the value
k

To keep the notation simple, we

will show

the query set as argument to the query, rather than the list of keys.
Thus q ( Z j , . . . d e n o t e s a query over a list of distinct keys that specify
the data elements z ^ , . • . A
(3)

q(z,,...,zO =
1

*

linear query has the form

k
I a. z.
j=l

3 J

for some fixed k > 2 and fixed "query weights" a^. This form of query
has been called a "weighted sum query" [SDD77].
The assumption that the query set size is fixed at k elements for
all queries is a degenerate case of the restriction that each query
set contains at least k elements.

When query set size can vary, as

for characteristic-specified queries, compromise can be even simpler
[DDS77].

Our objective here is to show how easy compromise can be even

when the intruder cannot exploit variation in query set size.
A sum query is a linear query with unit weights (all a.. =
Such queries are used to compute averages.

1).

Dobkin, Jones, and Lipton

[DJL76] developed upper and lower bounds on the number of sum queries
sufficient to compromise under the restriction that no two query sets
can overlap by more than r elements.

For N data elements with r = 1

and no initial information, compromise is possible within 2k-1 queries
2
2
if N > _ ^ = k -k+1; however, compromise is impossible when N < Nj = (k +k)/2.
Whether or not compromise is possible when N^ <_ N < ^
Davida et al tightened these bounds [Dav76].

was not resolved.
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Kam and Ullman studied the security of a class of key-matching sum
queries [KaU76].
data elements.

Each key is a bit-string of b bits, and there are

To make a query, the user specifies the values of some

set of a bits, where a _< b; the query program returns the sum of the
data elements whose keys match in the given a positions.

The data base

is secure whenever users have no initial information, if a < b, and if the
ranges of values of the data elements are unknown.

Otherwise compromise

may be possible.
A partitioned query is a linear query in a partitioned data base with
the restriction that the jth key specifies a data element from the jth
class; there are k classes in all.

Equation 2 is an example with four

classes.
Our results for linear queries and partitioned queries are outlined
in the next sections.
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The proofs are given in the appendices.

SECURITY OF LINEAR QUERIES
We consider queries of the form of Equation 3 applied to a data base

of N elements.

All queries use the same value of k and the same weights a^.

We observe first that, knowing one weight a^ and one data element x,
we can compromise the entire data base.

Let q^ and q^ be the responses

to. the two queries

=

1>•••»zjJx,Zj,...,z^)

q 2 = q(z1,...,z._1,y,z.+1>...,zk)

9

which differ only in their use of data elements x and y in the jth position.
Equation 3 shows that

(4)

(q r q 2 ) = a.Cx-y),

which can be solved for y.

Now the entire data base is vulnerable:

we

pose q^ once and a new q^ for each of the N-l unknown data elements,
effecting a full compromise with N queries and N-l applications of
Equation 4.

As soon as two data elements, x and y, are known, we can

also use Equation 4 to solve for any unknown weight.

EXAMPLE.

Suppose that the runner's data base implements the query

q(z1,z2,z3) = ,2z1 + -5z2 + . 3z3
A user knows that the weight of the first key is .2 and that Smith's
Max VOX is 68; thus the initial information is

a L = .2
X

11 =

68

To determine Jones's Max VOX, the user proceeds as follows.

He

poses the two queries q f x ^ x ^ x ^ ) and q(x 21J x 12J x 13 ), to which
the system will respond, respectively,

q a = 407.6
q 2 = 406.2
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Equation 4 can be used to solve for

X

21=

X

11 -

(q

rq2)/ai

= 68 - 1.4/.2
= 68-7
= 61

which is Smith's MAX VOX.

This reasoning suggests that security, if it is possible at all,
must require keeping all the weights secret.

But a more complex argument,

given in Appendix 1, shows that we can pose a set of queries which
yield a set of equations in the unknowns a^.

If these equations are

linearly independent, we can solve for the a^ and then use the known
value of one data element to compromise the rest of the data base.

In

other words, knowing only one data element and none of the weights often
suffices for a compromise.

The exact statement of the result is:

Compromising Weighted Sums.
key p.

Suppose that x^ is known for some

With no more than k(k+l) queries it may be possible to

determine

k

additional keys pl,...,pk.

The

remaining N-k-1 data elements can be deduced with an additional
N-k-1 queries using the method of Equation 4.
2

mise is possible within N+k -1 queries.

Thus full compro-
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The technique will be illustrated in an example below.
These arguments lead to the conclusion that security depends on
denying the inquirer any initial information about the data base —

for

example, by restricting his access to records about which he knows nothing.
In Appendix 2 we prove that such a restriction would work by showing the
impossibility of solving any system of equations for any weight or any
data element:

Secure Weighted Sums.

If the inquirer knows no data element,

the data base is secure under his queries.

Unfortunately there is no way to be absolutely sure that a user knows
nothing about the records to which his access has been restricted.
Even if such an idea were enforceable, the presence of other types of
queries can invalidate this result.

The unweighted-sum compromise of

Dobkin et al, for example, requires no initial knowledge [DJL76].
The next subsection illustrates the method of compromising a data
base using weighted sum queries when one data element is known.

Example.
Let y^ = x^j denote the Max VOX for runner i.
y^ = 68 is known.

Let k = 2 and suppose

The data base implements the query

q(z1,z2) = 2Zj + 3z2
but the weights (a^a-) = (2,3) are unknown.

Form three sets of two queries

12

q(y3>y2) = 295

q

10

=

q(y2,y3) = 290

q

q

20

=

q(y r y 3 ) = 304

q

= 316
21 = q(y3,yx)

q

30

=

q(y r y 2 ) = 319

q

= 326
32 = qCy2,yj)

a

ll

the numbers show the system's responses.

10

+ q

= 585
il = A(y 2+ y 3 )

20

+ q

= 620 = ^2
21 = A(y 1+ y 3 )

31

+ q

= 645
31 = A(y 1+ y 2 )

Let A = a.. + a_ and observe that

=

whereupon
A = Q j / C y ^ ) = Q2/C y ^ y 3 ) = ( y C y ^ )
This can be manipulated into two equations in unknowns y^ and y^:

-Q 2 y 2 - ( Q r Q 2 ^ 3 » -Q^i
Q2y2 - Q3y3

= (Q-j-Q^

For the given numbers,

-620 y 2 - 35 y 3 = -(585) (68)
620 y 2 - 645 y 3 = (25)(68)
It is easily verified that y 2 = 61 and y 3 = 56 is the solution.

We may

solve for a^ and a 2 using the equations

a

ly2

+ a

2y3

= q

10

a

lyl

+ a

2y3

= q

20

To find any other y i we solve q(y^,yi) = 136 + 3y^ once the system's
response is known.
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4.

PARTITIONED QUERIES
We consider weighted-sum queries with the restriction that each weight

a^ is associated with a separate class Y^ of data elements, and that the
key in a query's specification list must refer to the class Y^ . We denote
the number of data elements in Y. by N., so that N = E. N..
J

J

J

J

The columns of

the runner's data base are examples of classes.
We observe first that the method of Equation 4 can be used to compromise
all of class Y. if the weight
a. and some element x of that class both are
5
J
3
known.

In all, N^ queries are required for this.

If we know all the weights

and one data element in each class, we can compromise the entire data base
with N queries.
Suppose that we know all k of the weights and data elements from only
k-1 classes.

We can determine an element from the unknown class (say Y^)

with one query using the known elements from the other classes (say
Zj, .. . ,z^_1,z;.+1,. . . ,zk) :

(5)

q(z1,...,zk) = a 2 Z i + '•' +a k z k'

After the system responds with the value of this query, z^ is the only
unknown quantity in this equation.

It follows that full compromise is

possible with N+l queries when all weights are known and data elements
from all but one class are known.
Similarly, if we know one element from each class, and all but
one of the weights, we can apply Equation 5 using the known z^,...
the missing weight is the only unknown quantity.
again possible with N+l queries.

Full compromise is
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The method illustrated in the previous section was able to effect a
compromise when none of the weights was known and the entire data base was
a single class.

This method depends on permuting the same keys among dif-

ferent positions in the query specification lists.

Partitioning the data

bases prevents these permutations and makes compromise more difficult.
In Appendix 3 we prove that

If one knows all the weights, one data element from
each of k-2 classes, and no data element from the
other two classes, then full compromise of the k-2
known classes is possible.

The two unknown classes

are secure.

The proof shows that no system of equations constructed contains enough
information to solve for data elements in the unknown classes.

The proof

of this result shows further that every unknown class is secure provided
that at least two classes are unknown initially.
These results show that keeping the weights secret is essential to
security especially if users may know data elements from some of the
classes.

However, if other types of queries are possible in the same

data base, compromise may be possible without prior knowledge.

For example

2

DeMillo et al have shown that

0(k )

selection queries (median, maximum

minimum, etc.) can determine an element from an unknown class [DDL76];
such queries can provide the initial information needed to compromise with
partitioned queries.

(See also [Scw77].)
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6.

CONCLUSIONS
Our results have shown that the maximum tolerable information to

prevent compromise using weighted-sum or partitioned-weighted-sum queries
is quite low.

Security under weighted-sum queries can be assured only if

users have no prior knowledge of any data element; the weights
kept secret.

must be

Security in partitioned data bases can be assured only if

at least two of the weights or at least two of the classes are kept secret.
It is not always possible to keep weights secret, and it may be impossible
to enforce the restriction that the user knows no data element.
When

the inquirer has sufficient initial information for a compromise,

his task is easy.

At worst, he needs to pose one query for each unknown

data element in the (class of the) data base which he is compromising,
plus possibly a small additional but fixed number of queries.

If the data

base supports other types of queries such as selection queries, the user may
be able to deduce unknown data elements with small cost, before using
algorithms of this paper for a compromise.
Compromise of statistical data bases is usually possible, and it is
cheap.
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APPENDIX 1:

Compromising Linear Queries

We wish to show that knowing one data element, say z^, may be sufficient
to compromise a data base under linear queries.
three parts.

The compromise proceeds in

FiTst, k(k+l) queries are used to derive k+1 equations whose

solution yields k additional data elements z^,-••,z^+i•

Then the k+1 known

data elements are used to derive k more equations whose solution is the
weights aj,...,ak.

Finally, the method of Equation 4 is used to deduce

the remaining N-(k+l) unknown data elements.

Full compromise is achievable

2
with N-(k+l)+k(k+l) = N+k -1 queries in all.
Let Z = fz1,...,z.
—
^1
known.

n )7 be a list of data elements for which z, is
k+1
1

Let Z. be Z with z. deleted, and let Z.. denote the Jith one-step
— l — i
'
—ij
^

cyclic permutation of Z^.

(Note that Z ^ = Z^j,*) Let q^j denote the

response to the query q(Z^ .), where i = l,...,k+l and j = 0,...,k-l.

Note

that k(k+l) queries are needed to determine all the q^^.
Each element of Z^ is permuted into each of the k positions by the
queries qfZ^g),... jqfZ^ k_1!) • If S = z1+z2+. . . +

then the sum of

elements in Z^ is S-z^ and the sum of these permuted queries is
k-1
k-1
Qi = I qii = I a (S-z ) = ACS-z )
1
j=0 3
j=0 3
where A = aj+.-.+a^-

It follows that Q^^/(S-zi) = A = Q i+1 / (S-z^).

gives a set of k equations in the k unknowns z2» • • •j z]c+i:

s c v < W

+

W

i

- V i

+

i

s

0

=

This
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If these equations are linearly independent, their solution will yield
the values of

(If these equations are not linearly indepen-

dent, nothing can be concluded about the security of the data base,
because another choice of z ^ , . . . m i g h t produce a solvable set of
equations.)

We can use the known values of Zj,...^ to invert the

equations corresponding to the queries q(ZiQ),...,q(Zik) and find the
unknown coefficients:

-V 'V
a
—
2
• •2

10
l

20

•
•

*
*

- Zj,-

K -

l qk0

Now the method of Equation 4 can be applied to find the remaining
data elements.
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APPENDIX 2:

Secure Linear Queries

We suppose that the user has no initial knowledge about any data
element.

Our objective is proving that it is impossible for him to find

enough linearly independent equations to solve for any unknown data
element or query weight.
Consider any m queries
Z =

among which appear the data elements

}. We assume m >_ k+s since we can always pose more queries

without impairing our ability to compromise.

We will apply the Implicit

Function Theorem (IFT) [Gar68], which states that a set of functions
q^,...jqm over variables Xj,...,x

are mutually independent if the

detCM) t 0, where
3q,
ax.

I!]
9x
n

M =
9qm

m
3x
n

J

For our problem, the queries q ,...,qm depend on the n = k+s quantities
and z^,...,zsZ

11

The matrix is
2

lk , bll

b

Is

M =
2

2
mli *" ' mki i bml

ms

where z ^ is the member of Z appearing in the jth position of the ith
query, and

{ o!a .

a •,

if z.. = z^
1J
t
otherwise
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Let r = rank(M).

We observe that T < k+s because column k+p CP = l,...,s)

can be written as a linear combination of the others:
k

s
a

z

2
j ij " 2 z t b it
j=1
t=i

= b

ip z P

(i =

1

"'"m)

Note that z. . = z^ if and only if b.^ = a., which implies that the nonzero
ij
t.
it
j
terms in the second sum cancel all but b.
ip zp in the first.

Since r < k+s,

det(M) = 0, which implies that some of q1,...,qm are redundant.
Consider an rxr submatrix N of M formed by taking any r linearly
independent rows, and any r linearly independent columns except column
k+p. -Renumber the queries so that q^j-.->qr correspond to the TOWS of N.
By construction det(N) ^ 0, but any determinant of r+1 rows and columns
of M must be zero.

The IFT shows that

and that each query among

• • - >^+5

are mutually independent
can

be expressed in terms of

qx,.. .,qr [Gar68].
We will show that x^ is not a function of any of the queries
q^,...,qr.

To do this we treat x^ as a new function of the same quantities

(a^ or z^) on which q^,...,qr depend according to the matrix N; we add
the appropriate r+lst row and column of N:
3q,
3x
N
N' =
dx

_ _ E
0 0
It is not hard to see that det(N') = (-1) detCN) i* 0, which implies that
Xp is not a function of any quantity on which q^,...,qr depend and, therefore)
that Xp is not a function of any of q1,...,qi>.
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APPENDIX 3:

Secure Partitioned Queries

We wish to show that if all weights are known but no element from
at least two classes is known, then the unknown classes are secure.
The classes from which we know at least one element are vulnerable to
compromise via Equation 4.
It is sufficient to prove security when exactly two classes are
unknown since a procedure for compromising three or more unknown classes
could also be used to compromise two unknown classes.
t ie

the two unknown classes, and let
t ie

Yj and J^l'''''^2N

*

*

elements of Y 2<

Let Y^ and Y 2 be

elements of

Because data from the known

classes is functionally independent of data in the unknown classes,
are irrelevant to compromising Y^ and Y 2 .

Therefore we need

only to prove that queries of the form
q(Z:Lz2) = a i z i

+ a

2z2

cannot reveal any element of Y^ or Y,,.
Suppose that queries q ^ j ^

a v e

keen P os ed for i = l,...,m,

yielding responses q- ,... ,q . These queries can be represented by
the matrix equation
l

ll

a

lN x I bll

IN,

r

ll

I
IN,
mN,

ml

mN J
2
'21

'2N
2J
where

%

21

.

r v

if z

u " "u

0,

otherwise

a

if Z

2'

* 0,

i2

=

^2j

otherwise

n
Now let A^ represent the j;tth
column in the left part of the p by (Nj+^J

coefficient matrix, and B^ represent the j1-*1 coliimn of the right part.
Note that
N

—
a
l

1
2 A. - —
j=l 3 a 2

N

2
2 B. = 0.
j=l J

This means that the columns are not independent and that the rank of the
coefficient matrix is less than N^+N2 -- i.e., the system of equations
cannot be solved for any of the N^+N^ unknowns.
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